Empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic reforms is limited to few reforms, countries, and years. This paper studies the impact of democracy on the adoption of economic reforms using a new dataset on reforms in the financial, capital and banking sectors, product markets, agriculture, and trade for 150 countries over the period . Democracy has a positive and significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence that economic reforms foster democracy. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a large variety of controls and estimation strategies. JEL Classification Numbers: O57, E6
Introduction
Political and economic freedoms go hand in hand … or do they not? This is one of the oldest questions in economics and in political science, which is still largely unanswered. This paper answers this question using a novel dataset on economic reforms, which is the most exhaustive in the literature in terms of countries, years, and range of reform coverage.
This question is still open because there are very good theoretical arguments and numerous examples as to why political freedom can either hinder or facilitate economic reforms. Take the historical examples of Chile under Pinochet, or South Korea under Park.
In both cases, important economic reforms were undertaken under dictatorial regimes. The majority of the contemporary industrialized countries were not democracies when they took off (Schwarz, 1992) . In most cases, East Asian economies did develop under undemocratic regimes. In addition to these historical examples from every region of the world and different historical periods, there are compelling theoretical reasons as to why less democratic regimes may favor economic reforms and growth.
A fully democratic regime can fall prey to interest groups, which put their goals before general well being. Sometimes, capitalists entrenched in their rent-seeking positions are the main opponents of economic reforms. In a newly independent country only a 'benevolent dictator' can shelter the institutions, avoid that the state becomes captive of any specific interest group, and allow the state to perform its function in an efficient way. 1 1 Along these lines, Haggard (1990) argues "... Institutions can overcome collective-action dilemmas by restraining the self-interested behavior of groups through sanctions: collective action problems can be resolved by command."
In particular, interest groups can block reforms if there is uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) . In addition to pressure from interest groups, democracy can lead to excessive private and public consumption and lack of sufficient investment (Huntington, 1968) ; so dictatorial regimes can rely on financial repression to increase the domestic saving rate. Wages are typically higher under democracy (Rodrik, 1999) .
Several countries, including the Soviet Union and many East Asian countries, have been able to increase savings, and ultimately achieve high economic growth rate, thanks to a repressive political system and an attendant highly regulated financial system. In conclusion, do the historical examples and the theoretical arguments provide a compelling case against the role of democracy in fostering economic reforms? The answer to this question is a resounding no.
The alternative view that democracy often accompanies economic reforms is also based on strong theoretical arguments and solid empirical evidence. Secured property rights, as guaranteed by a democracy, are considered key to economic development. In general, dictators cannot credibly make commitments because of time-inconsistency; so no reform can be undertaken (McGuire and Olson, 1996) . Autocratic rulers tend to be predatory, disrupting economic activity and making any reform effort meaningless; autocratic regimes have also an interest in postponing reforms and maintaining rent-generating activities for a restricted number of supporting groups. On the opposite, democratic rulers should be more sensitive to the interest of the public, and so more willing to implement reforms, which destroy monopolies in favor of the general interests. In addition to these theoretical arguments, there is strong empirical evidence that reforms are highly correlated with democracy.
The correlation between democracy and economic reforms is very strong both across time and in a cross section. Figure 1 shows the correlation over time between the indices of democracy (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1) and reform (all the indices are normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the least reformed and 1 to the most reformed) in the following six sectors (or areas) 2 -(i) domestic financial, (ii) capital account, (iii) product markets (electricity and telecommunications), (iv) agriculture, (v) trade (based on tariffs) and (vi) current account transactions-over time. 3 The sharp contrast between these opposing views has left the question of the effects of democracy on economic reforms largely unanswered. The goal of this paper is to address again this issue using a novel database, which covers almost 150 countries, 6 sectors and spanning more than 40 years of data.
All the cases show a strong correlation between democracy and regulation, with democracy usually preceding the deregulation process. Figure 2 shows that the correlation holds very strongly also when we take a cross section: countries that are more democratic are also more reformed. However, these correlations in themselves do not show that democracy necessarily causes economic reforms. The correlation could run in the opposite direction, or both democracy and economic reforms could be driven by a common third factor.
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The main findings are that an increase in the quality of democratic institutions is significantly correlated with the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence of a feedback effect from economic to political liberalization. These results are robust to controlling for country, reform-specific effects and any possible interaction among them.
Global reform waves and possible country-time varying determinants of reforms (including crises, reforms in neighboring countries, existence of compensation for losers, human capital and bureaucratic quality, and several political variables) do not weaken these results, which are also robust to using an instrumental variable strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on economic reforms and democracy; Section 3 presents the data; Section 4 presents the results on the effects of democracy on reforms, controlling for other possible determinants of reforms and the possibility of reverse causality and omitted variables; Section 5 concludes.
Democracy and Reforms: Theory and Empirics
While there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature that considers the determinants of economic reforms in general, there is scarce evidence, particularly empirical, on the relationship between democracy and reforms. 4 Economic theory does not give a clear answer on whether political liberalizations favor or hinder economic reforms or if the relationship could go both ways. Democratic regimes could lead to more reforms if reforms create more winners than losers (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) . Democratically elected governments may also have greater legitimacy to implement and sustain policies bearing high short-term costs; similarly institutional changes-e.g., strengthening an independent legal system or a professional civil service required to ensure political freedom and democracy-could lead also to successful market reforms. Finally, democracy could create an environment conducive to economic reforms by limiting rent-seeking and putting in place a system of checks and balances (Dethier, Ghanem and Zoli, 1999) .
Alternatively, political liberalization could lead to less economic reforms if the electoral system creates a pivotal voter with veto power. For instance, it has been argued that Chile in the late 70s and the 80s implemented several forward-looking economic reforms because the military regime did not have to respond to a short-sighted electorate. At the same time, it has been argued that Costa Rica has been a laggard in economic reforms because the democratic system gives veto power to groups that can lose from reforms.
Democratic legislators are more likely to adopt time-inconsistent policies (Quinn 2000) . In fact, uncertainty about the impact of economic reforms at the individual level could also lead a rational electorate to vote against reforms even if they are known ex ante to benefit a majority of them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) .
The theoretical predictions about the feedback effect from economic reforms to democratization are ambiguous as well. For example, economic liberalizations could be associated with higher quality of democratic institutions if they increase the power of the middle class (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . On the other hand, liberalization could lower democracy through increases in income inequality and the associated political strife and violence (Quinn, 1997, Dixon and Boswell, 1996) .
On the empirical side, only a few empirical papers have looked at the relationship between democracy and reforms. Among the available evidence, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) study the feedback effects between economic and political liberalizations. Economic liberalization is defined as the event of becoming open, where openness is defined as in Wacziarg and Welch (2008) . Political liberalization is the event of becoming a democracy; where democracy is defined by strictly positive values of polity2. Using a panel of 140 countries over 1960-2000 (with country and year fixed effects), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) find evidence of a positive and significant relationship between democratizations and trade reforms; they find that the feedback effect could run in both directions although the causality is more likely to run from political to economic reforms. In comparison, we find little evidence of feedback effects from reforms to democracy. 5 Similarly, Persson (2005) shows that the forms of democracy (parliamentary, proportional and permanent ones) are important in explaining variation in trade reforms (measured by the Wacziarg and Welch index) and an index protection of property rights. 6 5 Not, however, that the results are not directly comparable because Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) consider only trade reforms. Amin and Djankov (2009) show that 6 Banerji and Ghanem (1997) , and Milner and Kubota (2005) also look at trade reforms. The former presents cross-country evidence to show that authoritarian regimes are associated with higher protectionism (measured by an index of protectionism from Dollar (1992)), while the latter show that democracy (measured by Freedom House or PolityIV scores) is good for micro-reforms (as defined in the World Bank's Doing Business Database). 7 Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) find evidence of a positive two-way relationship between democracy and globalization defined as trade and capital account liberalization. 8 Quinn (2000) examines the relationship between democracy and international financial liberalization. He measures international financial regulation through changes in current and capital account openness created using the Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions from the IMF. Democracy is measured by changes in polity2. Quinn uses both panel data techniques and individual country VARs for 40-50 countries over 1950-97 and finds evidence that democracies liberalize international finance, especially capital accounts.
Unlike this paper, he also finds evidence of feedback effects from financial liberalization to democratizations whereby capital account liberalization is associated with decreases in democracy 6 to 15 years later.
They, however, find that these effects are not uniform across time and space. while agriculture protection increases after a country's transition to democracy, there is no effect when the regime shifts from democracy to autocracy. regime changes towards democracy are associated with greater liberalization (measured by tariff rates and Sachs Warner indices). Banerji and Ghanem (1997) also find evidence that more authoritarian regimes are associated with greater wage distortions, as measured by the ratio of manufacturing wage rate to the nonmanufacturing value added per worker. 7 Micro-reforms are defined as reforms that lower the administrative costs of starting or running a business. The World Bank's Doing Business Database dataset covers only the last 5 years so a longterm analysis is not possible. 8 Their measure of trade liberalization is imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP; the authors also check the robustness of their results using the dichotomous measure of Wacziarg and Welch (2004) . Capital controls are measured combining information from the International Monetary Fund's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions together with historical data taken from Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) . 9 Mulligan, Gill and Sala-i-Martin (2004) do not look specifically at reforms, but analyze the effect of democracy on public spending and taxes. They do not find any significant relationship between democracy and total government consumption, education or social spending; but find that democracies are associated with flatter income taxes (or less income redistribution). (Bates and Krueger, 1993) have focused on case studies. This approach takes into account the complexity and the country specificity of the interaction between democracy and economic reforms.
To summarize, while there are many theoretical predictions about the relationships between political and economic liberalizations, empirical evidence on the subject is limited to reforms in particular sectors, in particular international trade and finance, micro-reforms, or specific countries over a short period.
Our study is the first one to combine a comprehensive coverage of reforms in different sectors, a significant coverage of countries and a long time period. In particular, the dataset used in this paper spans six sectors, and both developing and developed countries from the 1960 up until 2004. 
Capital account liberalization
The second measure of reform in the financial sector pertains to the extent of the external capital account liberalization. The index contains information on a broad set of restrictions including, for example, controls on external borrowing between residents and non-residents, as well as approval requirements for foreign direct investment (FDI).
Product market reforms
Turning to the real sector, the product market indicator covers the degree of liberalization in the telecommunication and electricity markets, including the extent of competition in the provision of these services, the presence of an independent regulatory authority, and privatization.
Agricultural market reforms
The agricultural sector indicator captures intervention in the market for the main agricultural export commodity in each country. It measures the extent of public intervention in the market going from total monopoly or monopsony in production, transportation or marketing (i.e., the presence of marketing boards), the presence of administered prices, public ownership of relevant producers or concession requirement to free market.
Trade reforms
Trade reforms are captured by using two different indicators: one based on tariffs and the other measuring the extent of current account liberalization. The indicator based on tariff liberalization is meant to capture distortions in international trade and is measured by average tariffs.
Current account liberalization reforms
The second indicator for measuring reform in the trade sector broadly measures the extent of current account liberalization. It captures the extent to which a government is compliant with its obligations under the IMF's Article VIII to free from government restriction the proceeds from international trade in goods and services.
Additional details on the sources and specifics of each indicator can be found in IMF (2008) and Table 1 .
Aggregation and normalization
For each of our six sectors, we construct an aggregate index by averaging the subindices for that particular sector (for the cases in which we do have multiple sub-indices, like product market or the financial sector). Each sectoral indicator is then normalized between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a higher degree of liberalization. "Reform" in any sector is then defined as an annual change in the index. Table 2 reports the pair wise correlations between different types of reforms. Financial sector, trade, current, and capital account reforms are strongly correlated among themselves, and less so with agricultural and product market reforms (with the exception of the financial sector reform which is strongly correlated to product market reforms). Overall the correlations indicate that once the process of reform in a country starts, it probably spreads over to several sectors. 10
Other data
We run most of our regressions at the sector-country and year level; however as one of our robustness checks we also aggregate the six reform indicators using a principal component analysis.
Democracy is measured using the standard, well-established measure of democracy taken from the Polity IV database. In particular, we use the combined polity2 index ranging from -10 to 10 (-10=high autocracy; 10=high democracy).
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We also include in our specifications the following controls:
We normalize the index so that 1 indicates the most democratic country and 0 the least democratic regime.
• Initial level of regulation (as measured by the lagged level of the regulation index):
this variable can be a proxy for important incentives in favor and against the implementation of structural reforms. Excessive government regulation and/or market failures may be perceived as more costly when the economy is least reformed.
At the same time, the beneficiaries of existing large rents may oppose reforms.
• Economic crisis: According to a widely held view, economic crises foster economic reforms by making evident the cost of stagnation and backwardness. The opposite view maintains that it is easier to implement reforms during periods of economic growth when potential losers can find other opportunities in a booming economy or when countries become richer and have more resources to compensate the losers. In order to test this hypothesis, we use several measures of crisis: a dummy equal to 1 if the country is experiencing inflation larger than 40 percent in that year, a measure for recession (as summarized by a dummy indicating negative growth in per-capita GDP), terms of trade shocks, and banking and debt crisis. 12 10 This paper does not consider the issue of sequencing among different types of reforms. For an analysis of sequencing see IMF (2008) , showing that trade reforms tend to precede financial and capital account reforms. 11 We also check our results using the Freedom House Index and the index proposed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1993) . For an exhaustive discussion of these indices, see Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) or Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) . Note that the trend toward more democratic regimes has not been linear. Significant retrenchment of democracy has not only been observed in isolated countries but also in several regions of the world. The examples include the general decrease in democracy in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, the marked decline in Latin America in 1960s and 1970s, and the prolonged stasis in Africa since the 1960s (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) . 12 The data on banking and debt crises come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) .
• Public expenditures/GDP and real devaluation: Compensation schemes can offset costs associated with reforms. A large government may compensate losers from reforms than a very lean government with a small budget. We use public expenditures/GDP as a proxy of the size of social safety nets. As an alternative measure of compensation, we also control for real devaluation, which could promote exports and therefore help compensate losers from reforms. 13
• Human capital and effectiveness of bureaucracy could also facilitate reforms (Besley and Personn, 2007) . We use enrollment in tertiary education from Barro and Lee (2001) Table A1 provides the summary statistics for the key variables used in the empirical analysis.
Empirical strategy
The unit of analysis is a sector-country-year observation (there are 6 sectors, 150
countries, and 45 years); the resulting dataset is a panel of 20,123 observations. We define reform as a change over time in the index of regulation for each of the six sectors, s, in country c at time t:
Our baseline specification is as follows:
where s δ , c γ and t χ are sector, country, and year fixed effects, respectively, and
are country-specific and time-varying controls to be described below. and represent the interactions between country and sector; and sector and time fixed effects respectively. We also control for the lagged level of the index to identify the existence of convergence toward some possible country specific levels of regulation.
The dependent variable (reform) is highly persistent; for this reason the error terms in specification (1) may also exibit serial correlation. 18
We allow for first-order serial correlation in the error terms: . 19 In specifications (2) and (4), we allow the serial correlation coefficient in the error term to be country-sector specific. 20 Our first specification includes only sector, country, and time fixed effects (Table 3, column 1). The coefficient on the lagged level of the index is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating convergence toward country specific levels of regulation. The
In specification (3), we allow the serial correlation coefficient to be country specific. In Table 7b we also test the robustness of our results by clustering the error terms at the country level.
term for the executive and the presence of an absolute majority in the legislature by the party of the executive. The results are robust to the inclusion of these additional political variables. 18 Note, however, that the reform variables do not have a unit root being bounded between zero and one. 19 The Durbin-Watson statistics is 1.94 indicating that there is little evidence of serial correlation in the error terms. 20 Note that specifications (2)-(4) reduce slightly the estimation sample because one observation per country is used to calculate the correlation coefficient of the error terms.
coefficient on the lagged level of democracy is significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated effect implies that a one standard deviation increase in the democracy index explains 7 percent variability in reforms. In addition, moving to a complete democracy in the long-run is associated with a 0.22
increase in the index of reform (using the coefficients of column 1).
We then add country-sector specific effects, and sector-year specific effects and both of them (column 2, 3 and 4 respectively). The interactions between country and sector fixed effects take into account that reforms are inherently different across countries, e.g., trade sector reforms in India have different characteristics than banking reforms in Brazil The results in Table 3 show that the correlation between (past) democracy level and the adoption of reforms is not driven by country or sector-fixed characteristics or by the fact that there was a worldwide movement toward reforms and democracy, or any interactions between country-sector and sector-time fixed characteristics.
If the correlation between economic reforms and democracy is not due to spurious correlation owing to a common trend, could it be driven by other country-time varying omitted variables? The next subsection checks whether this correlation is robust to the inclusion of several variables, which (current theories suggest) may explain both economic reforms and democracy, i.e., the possible bias deriving from country-sector-time varying omitted variables.
Additional controls
Reforms may be triggered by a wide range of factors other than democracy.
Following the theoretical literature reviewed above, in Table 4 we control for the following possible determinants of reforms: a measure of crisis (a dummy equal to 1 if the country experiences inflation larger than 40 percent) 21
In many countries, difficult fiscal situations were associated with monetization of deficit and high inflation. For this reason, we take hyperinflation (defined as inflation larger than 40 percent) as an indicator of (unresolved) fiscal crisis. Not surprisingly, episodes of hyperinflation appear to reduce the probability of reforming (Column 1), although the effect is small and significant only at the 10% level. Moreover, when we include all the controls in column (6), only initial structural conditions and democracy appear to be significant in explaining reforms , public expenditure/GDP and real devaluation, human capital and bureaucratic quality, reforms in neighbors, and political variables (columns 1-5).
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Of all the variables, reforms in neighboring countries appear to spur domestic reforms.
. Bureaucratic quality and public expenditure/GDP also appear to matter but with coefficients which are low and only significant at the 10% level. 23 This result, which extends the results of IMF (2004) on OECD countries, is also in line with Buera, Monge, and Primiceri (2008) , who find a spillover effect from beliefs in neighboring countries. The inclusion of these variables does not decrease the significance of democracy in explaining the adoption of reforms.
Endogeneity
Another source of bias derives from the fact that reforms themselves may have an effect on democracy. In order to deal with this issue we have two approaches: 1) we use instrumental variables, and 2) we check if reforms cause democracy (in the final section of the paper).
While an ideal source of exogenous variation of democracy is difficult to find, we use democracy in neighboring countries as an instrument where we introduce the concept of 21 We include alternative measures of crisis in Table 7b . 22 For each column in Table 4 , we also estimate the basic specification (Table 3 , column 4) on the restricted sample with fewer observations (not shown) to analyze the effect of adding controls on a consistent sample. The results shown in Table 4 do not appear to be driven by sample selection. We also include additional controls viz. dummies for WTO, EU, and OECD accessions (=1 in years following the accession); and for the existence of an IMF program. Democracy continues to have a positive and statistical effect on reforms, after controlling for these. Accession to EU and OECD; and the existence of an IMF program are significant in explaining reforms; however, they are not significant when included with all the controls in column (6) of Table 4 (results are available upon request). 23 The controls are described in the data section. Note also that the different control variables reduce substantially the sample size.
political distance to define the neighbors. The idea behind this instrument is that democracy in political allies has influence on domestic democracy but no direct impact on a country's ability to reform. For instance, the political alliance between the U.S. and Western Europe had surely an effect on democracy in Western Europe but not a direct effect on the reform level in Europe. 24 Table 5A shows the regressions using lagged democracy in political neighbors as an instrumental variable. As expected, the first-stage F statistics confirm the relevance of democracy in neighbors in promoting the democratic process in the domestic economy (the first stage of our IV regression is presented in Table 5B ). The results in our second stage
show that, consistent with the OLS specification, there is evidence for a strong and positive effect of democracy on reforms. Notice that the estimated effect is not statistically significant in the specification which includes all the controls (column 1c). The magnitude of the estimated effect is, however, not significantly different from Column 1b, which uses a larger sample and a restricted set of controls suggesting that the statistical insignificance in specification 1c is likely to be driven by the large standard errors from the smaller sample.
The regression in column 1d, where the sample is the same as column 1c but without the inclusion of controls, indeed confirms that this is the case.
Regressions by sector
Does democracy have a differential effect across sectors? Alternatively, are the results presented above driven by a particular sector? We explore this possibility by looking at the impact of democracy on different sectors. The results in Table 6 show that, with the exception of product markets (electricity/telecommunication), democracy promotes reforms in all other sectors, with the estimated effect being statistically significant at the one percent level in all sectors. The fact that democracy is not significant in explaining reforms in electricity/telecommunications may be due to the fact that global waves (which are captured by year effects) drive the adoptions of reforms in these sectors. 24 The idea underlying this instrument is based on Persson and Tabellini (2009) , who use democracy in neighboring countries as a proxy for democratic capital. In addition, building on this concept, we also tried different measures of distance, including geographical distance between countries and commercial distance defined as the (inverse of) trading flows between countries. While these measures are highly correlated, they confirm the result of political distance reported here.
the number of observations so that we can control for country, reform, and year fixed effects and (most importantly) their interactions as shown in Table 3 .
Other robustness checks
In Table 7a , we carry out several robustness checks. 25 In columns 1a-1b and 2a-2b, the sample is restricted to communist and developing countries respectively (we estimate two regressions for each subsample with and without the inclusion of controls). In columns 3a-3b, we use a zero-one definition of democracy (as in Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) , where democracy=1 if polity2 has positive values. Using a zero-one definition of democracy does not change our results (the results are weaker when we include all the controls, but this is driven by the fact that the sample size is much smaller, in column 3c we indeed show that the impact of democracy on reform on the restricted sample but without the inclusion of controls is also not significant). Table 7b shows that the results are also robust to different standard error corrections (instead of explicitly allowing for an AR(1) term in the model, the standard errors are clustered at the country-reform level) (column 1). Reforms in trading partners (column 2) and reforms in other sectors (column 3) also do not alter our main conclusion, and the results are also robust to a variety of crisis definitions (negative percapita GDP growth, banking and debt crises and terms-of-trade shocks-columns 4 to 7). We also find very similar results when we follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and include a political reform variable defined as a dummy taking the value of 1 in the years after democratization (where democratization is defined as the event of becoming a democracy, given that a country was not a democracy in the previous year) 26 By including the lagged level of reform, the specifications so far have assumed that there is (conditional) convergence in the reform adoption.
. 27 25 For each specification with controls in Table 7a , we also estimated the basic specification (Table 3 , column 4) without any controls on the restricted sample (not shown). We do this to analyze the effect of adding controls on a consistent sample. The results in Table 7a are not driven by sample selection.
However, unlike growth regressions, there is no theoretical reason why we should expect convergence in the level of regulation. In order to test if our results depend on this assumption, we replicate the specification in Table 3 without the lagged reform index using the following specification:
Column (9) in Table 7b reports the results from estimating Equation (2). The estimated coefficient on lagged (democracy) is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient (β= 0.011) is smaller than in Table 3 . 28 This coefficient, however, is not exactly comparable to the coefficient in the previous regressions in Table 3 given that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on democracy in this regression can be interpreted only as the effect of democracy on the rate of adoption of structural reforms rather than on the steady-state level.
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Finally, in Table 8 , we find some evidence for non-linear effects of democracy on reforms: the more democratic the country is initially, the easier it is to reform. 
The feedback effect
In this section, we check whether economic reforms could foster the democratic process in a country. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) find evidence of a possible feedback effect from economic liberalization (when looking only at the trade sector) and the democratic process. We test for the possibility of a feedback effect from reforms to democracy by estimating the following regression
Overall, we find that democracy promotes reform, while we do not find any evidence that reforms promote the democratic process (Table 9a). 31 28 This is consistent with a positive correlation between (lagged) democracy and the lagged reform index, and a negative relationship between reform and the lagged reform index.
Our results therefore do 29 Note that unlike Equation (1), the specification in Equation (2) has the drawback that the steady state level of the index is undefined; hence the long-run effect of democracy on the reform index cannot be estimated. In effect , we are assuming that a certain level of democracy is associated only with a rate of growth of the reform index. Column (9) in Table 7b repeats only the final specification in Table 3 without the lagged reform index. The estimated coefficient on lagged democracy is identical when we replicate columns (1)- (3) in Table 3 without the lagged reform index (results available upon request). 30 We also explore whether democracy affects the probability of reversal in reforms (defined as a decrease in the level of index) and do not find any evidence for this hypothesis. 31 For robustness, we also estimate Equation (3) with longer lags; but do not evidence for any feedback effects (results available on request).
not support a reverse causality story. 32 We also repeat the same exercise reform by reform and find little evidence of feedback for most reforms with the exception of reforms in domestic financial sector and current account. Reforms in these sectors seem to reduce the probability of democratization. The results are qualitatively similar to Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) , who argue that for trade reforms, "causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalizations rather than vice versa".
Factor analysis
In this section, we implement a different approach from the panel analysis presented above. To take into account the possibility that the reform process is one unique process common to all sectors, we undertake a factor analysis of our measures of reforms in the six sectors. In particular, we extract the first principal component from the whole dataset with all the data on reforms for each sector. 33 The results are reported in Table 10 . The impact of democracy seems to be relevant for the overall tendency of a country to reform (the coefficient on the lagged level of democracy is significant at the 1 percent level): moving to a complete democracy in the long-run is associated with a 0.03 increase in the index of reform (the magnitude doubles when we instrument for lagged democracy using lagged democracy in neighboring countries). On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of a feedback effect from the impact of the overall tendency of a country to reform on democracy.
Conclusions
The question of whether democratic countries favor economic reforms is central to the political economy literature. Political economists study why apparently welfare-enhancing reforms are postponed or adopted with long delays and the presence (or the absence) of democracy is one of the main causes investigated. Unfortunately, despite the vast theoretical literature and limited empirical evidence (restricted to some set of countries, to some reforms and to some periods), the answer to this question has been tentative because of data limitations, which has also limited the techniques that can be used. 32 Since income is considered an important determinant of democratization, we also test robustness to including per capita income in the regressions (results available upon request). Including the lagged level of the index, rather than the change as in Table 9a , also does not alter the findings in Table 9a . 33 The variable is then normalized between 0 and 1 to make the results comparable to the remaining part of the paper.
This paper answers this question using a novel dataset on structural reforms, which encompasses several sectors and many countries for several years. This dataset allows us to control for a set of possible omitted variables, including country and reform fixed effects, possible two-way interactions between the fixed effects and waves of reforms.
The main conclusions of the papers are that 1) democracy and economic reforms are positively correlated (after controlling for country and reform-specific characteristics, any interaction between country and reform characteristics, and global reform waves); 2) this correlation is robust even after we control for standard factors, which are usually correlated with reforms and democracy, including bureaucratic quality and education, and political stability; 3) the correlation is also robust to the variables that are usually associated with reforms (but not necessarily with democracy) such as crises, neighboring country effects, and compensation schemes; and 4) there is no evidence that economic reforms pave the way for political reforms.
The strong correlation between (lagged) democracy and the adoption of economic reforms, even controlling for many possible omitted factors as well as the finding that past economic reforms are not associated with the adoption of democracy, point to the fact there is probably a causal link from democracy to reforms.
These strong results call for an effort to study the precise mechanisms through which democracy has an impact on economic reforms. Notes: This figure shows the correlation in 2000 between the indices of democracy on the y-axis (measured as polity IV and normalized between 0 and 1) and reforms on the x-axis (all the indices are normalized between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to the least reformed and 1 to the most reformed) in the following eight sectors (or areas) -(i) domestic financial, (ii) capital account, (iii) product markets (electricity and telecommunications), (iv) agriculture, (v) labor, (vi) trade (based on tariffs) and (vii) current account transactions. The country codes and groups used in this figures are described in Tables A2 and A3 . The index of domestic financial liberalization is an average of six subindices, five related to banking and one related to the securities market.
Banking
The banking subindex is an average of the following 5 indicators: (i) interest rate controls, such as floors or ceilings; (ii) credit controls, such as directed credit and subsidized lending; (iii) competition restrictions, such as limits on branches and entry barriers in the banking sector, including licensing requirements or limits on foreign banks; (iv) the degree of state ownership; and (v) the quality of banking supervision and regulation, including power of independence of bank supervisors, adoption of Basel capital standards, and a framework for bank inspections.
Securities market
The sixth subindex relates to securities markets and covers policies to develop domestic bond and equity markets, including (i) the creation of basic frameworks such as the auctioning of T-bills, or the establishment of a security commission; (ii) policies to further establish securities markets such as tax exemptions, introduction of medium-and long-term government bonds to establish a benchmark for the yield curve, or the introduction of a primary dealer system; (iii) policies to develop derivative markets or to create an institutional investor's base; and (iv) policies to permit access to the domestic stock market by nonresidents. The subindices are aggregated with equal weights. Each subindex is coded from zero (fully repressed) to three (fully liberalized). Data sources Abiad and others (2008) , following the methodology in Abiad and Mody (2005) , based on various IMF reports and working papers, central bank websites, and others. 
Product markets

Electricity
The electricity indicators capture (i) the degree of unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution; (ii) whether a regulator other than government has been established; and (iii) whether the wholesale market has been liberalized; and (iv) privatization. Each subindex is coded from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 2.
Telecommunication
The telecommunication indicator captures (i) the degree of competition in local services; (ii) whether a regulator other than government has been established; (iii) the degree of liberalization of interconnection changes; and (iv) privatization. Each subindex is coded from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 2.
Data sources
Electricity: Based on various existing studies and datasets as well as national legislation and other official documents. Telecommunication: Based on IMF commodities data, various existing studies and datasets, and national legislation and other official documents. Coverage 1960 Coverage -2003 ; Minimum and maximum number of countries in any year are 106 and 108 respectively.
Agriculture market
The index captures intervention in the market for the main agricultural export commodity in each country. The index can take four values (i) zero (public monopoly or monopsony in production, transportation, or marketing, e.g., export marketing boards); (ii) one-third (administered prices); (iii) two-thirds (public ownership of relevant producers or concession requirements); and (iv) one (no public intervention 
Current account
Current account liberalization is defined with an indicator describing how compliant a government is with its obligations under the IMF's Article VIII to free from government restriction the proceeds from international trade in goods and services. The index represents the sum of two subcomponents, dealing with restrictions on trade in visibles, as well as in invisibles (financial and other services). It distinguishes between restrictions on residents (receipts for exports) and on nonresidents (payments for imports). Although the index measures restrictions on the proceeds from transactions, rather than on the underlying transactions, many countries in practice use restrictions on trade proceeds as a type of trade restriction. The index is scored between zero and 8 in half-integer units, with 8 indicating full compliance.
Data sources
Based on the methodology in Quinn (1997) and Quinn and Toyoda (2007) Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Table 4 Reforms and democracy, robustness to controls Dependent variable: reform in (country, sector, year)
Lagged democracy 0.011*** 0.014** 0.048*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.045*** Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. All regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. Lagged democracy is instrumented by (lagged) democracy in neighboring countries. All regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. All regressions control for country sector, year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. In Columns 1a-1b and 2a-2b, the sample is restricted to communist and developing countries respectively. In Columns 3a-3b, we use a zero-one definition of democracy (as in Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) , where democracy=1 if polity2 has positive values. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. In Column (1), instead of explicitly allowing for an AR(1) term in the model, the standard errors are clustered at the country-reform level. In Column (8), political reform is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in the years after democratization. Democratization is defined as the event of becoming a democracy, given that a country was not a democracy in the previous year. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects and country*sector and sector*year interactions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Note. The estimators are within estimators and allow for first-order autoregressive disturbance term. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
